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Abstract
This paper presents the deductive formal verification of high-level properties of control systems
with theorem proving, using the Why3 tool. Properties that can be verified with this approach include
stability, feedback gain, and robustness, among others. For the systems, modelled in Simulink, we
propose three main steps to achieve the verification: specifying the properties of interest over the
signals within the model using Simulink blocks, an automatic translation of the model into Why3,
and the automatic verification of the properties with theorem provers in Why3. We present a
methodology to specify the properties in the model and a library of relevant assertion blocks (logic
expressions), currently in development. The functionality of the blocks in the Simulink models are
automatically translated to Why3 as ‘theories’ and verification goals by our tool implemented in
MATLAB. A library of theories in Why3 corresponding to each supported block has been developed
to facilitate the process of translation. The goals are automatically verified in Why3 with relevant
theorem provers. A simple first-order discrete system is used to exemplify the specification of the
Simulink model, the translation process from Simulink to the Why3 formal logic language, and the
verification of Lyapunov stability.
1 Introduction
The use of formal methods allows the production of reliable and certified trustworthy autonomous sys-
tems [12, 25] in a more automatic manner, facilitating the processes of verification and validation, and
introducing methodologies for systems design towards verification. Verification has become essential for
safety-critical autonomous systems. Autonomous systems have different compositional levels [12]: agent
(high-level planning and decision making), control (neural networks, controllers or control systems) and
hardware implementation. Many proposed modelling formalisms and formal verification examples deal
with the first layer only [9, 26, 30], or the first and second combined in a high-level abstraction (e.g.,
hybrid systems). For the latter, some approaches use theorem proving [19]. Other approaches translate
the systems to decidable automata models and apply model checking [10,18,20], but these are not easily
applicable to real-valued operations due to problems with scalability. Additionally, optimisation theory
has been used to verify functionality and robustness of controllers for autonomous systems [14,29].
The design of control systems typically begins with formal analysis followed by numerical implemen-
tation in a simulation tool like Simulink. Numerical simulations then test for correct behaviour before
the implementation is deployed. In some cases, automatic code generation [24] is used to derive code
directly from the simulation model. In this paper, we propose the application of deductive formal veri-
fication methods on the implementation of the controller in Simulink. This allows greater confidence in
the correctness of the model with respect to its requirements. In particular, the paper provides a way to
translate Simulink models into the Why3 logic language to automatically prove results such as decrease
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of a Lyapunov function. One of the future aims of proposed approach is to verify the correctness of
controllers based on an optimiser; for example, predictive controllers for UAV guidance [21,22].
Why3 is a free and open source tool that interfaces with different theorem provers, particularly their
Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers. SMT solvers are extensions of SATisfiability (SAT) solvers
that can accommodate real numbers, integers, and other domains (theories), and are thus well-suited to
prove control systems properties [8]. Automatic theorem provers currently supported by Why3 include
Alt-Ergo, CVC3, CVC4, E-prover, Gappa, Simplify, SPASS, Vampire, veriT, Yices and Z3, along with
the interactive provers Coq and PVS [11]. An SMT solver automatically computes the satisfiability of a
logic formula based on a range of provided axioms and definitions.
The closest prior work to this paper in implementation is Simcheck [23], which uses SMT solvers to
perform type checking on a Simulink model with custom annotations. Stability based on Nichols plots
has been verified for a system modelled in Simulink using the MetiTarski theorem prover [8]. Other
approaches generate annotated C code from the model, then apply theorem proving to verify stability
properties [15, 17]. Functional correctness of auto-generated code from Simulink models has also been
formally verified through theorem provers [1, 2, 6, 28] and model checking [27].
The main novel contributions in this paper are:
• A methodology to specify high-level properties for control systems in Simulink, supplemented by
our custom blocks.
• An automatic translation tool from Simulink to Why3, for formal verification of the properties.
Our aim in pursuing this approach is to ease the inclusion of verification at design time, by incorporating
it at the block diagram level where system interconnections and insight are best expressed.
In our proposed approach, higher-order logic requirements are incorporated and verified as Simulink
signals [5]. Note that this enables the same requirements to be tested by numerical simulation. This
approach is partly inspired by the Open Verification Library (OVL) [16], a library of modules that act as
property checkers and can be placed into a hardware design where they are connected to regular modules
using the circuit signals. For example, our new custom ‘Require’ block, containing the built-in ‘Assert’
block, incorporates pre- and post-conditions into the Simulink model. Then the automatic translation
process to Why3 identifies the ‘Require’ blocks as goals for theorem proving. Meanwhile, each other
block in the model is translated into the axioms it asserts relating its input and output signals. Finally,
Why3 is invoked to run a chosen SMT solver on the translated ‘theory’ and prove the goals, or otherwise.
The rest of the paper presents relevant aspects of the Why3 language, and our proposed approach.
Section 2 introduces our developed assertion blocks, particularly the ‘Require’ block. Section 3 presents a
review of the Why3 logic language components. Section 4 describes the translation process from Simulink
to Why3, based on our developed theories in Why3 for different blocks. The translation is exemplified
by a discrete system. Section 5 explains the verification of Lyapunov stability for the same discrete
system. The presented approach is discussed in the same section. Finally, the conclusion is presented in
Section 6.
2 Assertion Blocks
We are developing a set of assertion blocks analogous to OVL for hardware verification [16], to add to
Simulink models to test and verify high-level requirements through specifications (as assertions) over
the signals in the models. The OVL was developed to facilitate the addition of verification conditions
(predefined logic expressions that can act as assertions, e.g. ‘event X always happens’, assumptions or
coverage points) to any hardware design, for assertion-based verification [13] or formal verification. The
OVL checkers, written in Hardware Description Languages, receive names of the signals of interest as
inputs, and are being monitored at simulation time when assertion violations are being recorded. The
same assertions can serve as goals for formal verification.
The new blocks represent a range of assertions (logic expressions) to describe properties of interest
related to control systems over signals, and others refer to structure for the assertions. Available Simulink
assertion and logic blocks like ‘Compare To Zero’, ‘Compare To Constant’ and ‘Assertion’ are also used
as part or in conjunction with the new assertion blocks. The ‘Require’ block denotes a requirement in a
Hoare triple form [3]
{preconditions} → [model]{postconditions}, (1)
where the logic expressions for the preconditions and postconditions are translated from the assertion
blocks connected to the ‘Require’ block. The translator automatically produces the verification goals
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(a) The ‘Require’ Block.
(b) ‘Enabled Subsystem’ Inner
Blocks.
(c) The ‘Require’ Block and Inner
Components.
Figure 1: A First-Order System Specified with Assertion Blocks in Simulink.
for the theorem prover from these blocks. The ‘Require’ block is an enabled subsystem with an ‘Assert’
block inside (Fig. ??). They use native Simulink and MATLAB formats, thus allowing numerical testing
in simulation and coverage assessment.
In the first-order system of Fig. 1, we have implemented a Lyapunov function V (x) = x2 for the anal-
ysis of stability. Three ‘Require’ blocks (‘require’, ‘require1’ and ‘require2’) describe stability properties
parametrised by signals in the model:
• ‘require’: x 6= 0→ V (x(k))−V (x(k− 1)) < 0. If the signal x is different from 0, the signal leaving
the ‘Difference’ block should be negative.
• ‘require1’: x 6= 0 → V (x) > 0. If the signal x is different from 0, then the signal V (x) should be
positive.
• ‘require2’: x = 0→ V (x) = 0. If the signal x is 0, then the signal V (x) should be zero.
More complex assertions are built-up from multiple basic blocks, which guarantees their translatability
into Why3 (using the predefined theories for basic blocks) and preserves the modularity in Simulink.
Properties can be verified in independent sections of blocks, or even within blocks inside subsystems.
Individual proofs can be assembled into a hierarchical proof structure, to provide conclusions at a higher
level from the sequence and relations of the lower-level proofs.
3 Review of Why3 Syntax
The Why3 logic language is based on polymorphic types and first-order logic, although higher-order logic
syntax is allowed [4,11]. The WhyML language targets the formal verification of programs, by including
loops and other control structures. The Why3 logic language is sufficient to express and verify block
diagrams from Simulink due to their declarative nature. The translation from Simulink to Why3 logic
expressions is based on the following Why3 components:
• Theories: blocks of logic expressions with types, functions, predicates, axioms, lemmas and verifi-
cation goals that can be used or cloned in a modular manner. More complex theories can be formed
from basic theories, inheriting the axioms, lemmas, functions and declarations. They contain the
components for a proof.
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theory Product_int
use import int.Int
use import real.RealInfix
function in1 int: real
function in2 int: real
function out1 int: real
axiom v: forall k:int. out1 k = in1 k *. in2 k
axiom c1: forall k:int. in1 k >. 0.0 /\ in2 k >. 0.0 -> out1 k >. 0.0
axiom c2: forall k:int. in1 k <. 0.0 /\ in2 k <. 0.0 -> out1 k >. 0.0
end
Figure 2: Theory for the ‘Product’ Block.
theory <Name>
...
end
• Functions: operations over data, that can be recursive and accept different types (e.g., integers,
real, Boolean). The parameters are expressed in curried syntax, where a function f(x) becomes
f x.
function <name> <inputs> <types> : <outputs> <types>
• Axioms and lemmas: logic expressions to help a proof.
axiom/lemma <name>: <logic expression>
• Goals: logic expressions to prove.
goal <Name>: <logic expression>
• Theories can be used (same symbols) and cloned (no reuse of symbols) in other theories. Some
basic theories are available, including real numbers, integers, floating-point and lists.
use import <file_name>.<Name>
clone <file>.<Name> as <New_name> with function
<name> = <new_name>
We have developed a library of theories that provide axioms applicable to the input-output behaviour
corresponding to popular Simulink blocks, including arithmetic and logic, to facilitate the translation
into Why3. The theories are cloned following the components of a block diagram, and the axioms within
each theory are parametrised according to signal names and specific values (constants, input ranges or
initial conditions). The theory developed for the ‘Product’ block is shown in Fig. 2. In the future,
additional linear algebra and control systems related theories will be developed as needed in order to
verify more complex systems and properties, as in [15].
In the Product_block theory, the theories of the integer and real numbers are imported first. Then,
two functions are used for the inputs and another for the output. They receive an integer (time sample)
and produce a real (the signal value at that time). Three axioms describe the multiplication and some
sign properties: for all sampled times, forall k:int., the output signal is equal to the multiplication of
the inputs (axiom v); the multiplication of two positive numbers produces a positive number (axiom c1);
and the multiplication of two negative numbers produces a positive number (axiom c2). The algebraic
and logic symbols are used with a dot when a theory mixes integer and real numbers (i.e., both theories
are imported in the same theory), whereas if a theory only uses integer or real numbers, the symbols are
used without the dot [4].
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theory CompareToZero_neq_int
use import int.Int
use import real.RealInfix
use import bool.Bool
function in1 int: real
function out1 int: bool
axiom v1: forall k:int. out1 k = True -> in1 k <>. 0.0
axiom v2: forall k:int. out1 k = False -> in1 k = 0.0
end
Figure 3: Theory for the ‘Compare To Zero’ Block, for the ∼= 0 Case.
The theory developed for the ‘Compare To Zero’ block with condition case ∼= 0 (not equal to zero)
is shown in Fig. 3.
In the CompareToZero_block_ne0 theory, the theories of the integer, real and Boolean numbers
are imported first. Then, a function is defined for the input and another for the output. The input
receives an integer (time sample) and produces a real value (the signal value at that time), whereas the
output produces a Boolean value (True or False). Two axioms describe the conversion from a real
valued signal (input) to a Boolean (output), according to the comparison criterion: if the input value is
different to zero (axiom v1), the output is True; and if the input value is zero the output is False.
4 Translation from Simulink to Why3
The automatic translation process from Simulink to Why3 converts the signals and blocks into higher-
order logic predicates [5]. For example, the functionality of a ‘Product’ block over two inputs and an
output signal in discrete intervals of time (k) is expressed in higher-order logic [5] as
Product(in1, in2, out1) ≡ ∀k. out1(k) = in1(k) ∗ in2(k). (2)
The proposed and implemented procedure for the translation of systems as block diagrams in Simulink
into Why3 language consists of the following steps, executed in automatically in MATLAB when calling
the translator function:
1. Identification of the specification blocks from the rest of the model. For example, ‘Require’ blocks
and their associated preconditions and postconditions, where the latter two are directly connected
to the respective labelled inputs of the ‘Require’ blocks.
2. The Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) [7,23] of the model is computed automatically. We implemented a
program that identifies the predecessors and successors of each block, using the block manipulation
functions available in MATLAB. Each AST is translated into a theory in Why3, named after the
model to be verified. Relevant numerical theories including real numbers, integers and Boolean
expressions are imported.
3. Then, every signal that leaves a block is identified, named and translated to real or Boolean
functions. Functions that receive an integer represent discrete signals (i.e., signals of the form y(k)
where k is the time step):
function <block_name>_op<n> int: <real/bool>
where <n> is the corresponding output port (in case the block has more than one), int indicates
if the signal is discrete, and real/bool indicates if the signal is numeric or Boolean, respectively.
In this paper, all the signals in Simulink are scalar and discrete, although the translation and
verification will be extended to continuous time in the future.
4. Afterwards, the theories corresponding to all the blocks in the system are cloned automatically,
with parametrisation (e.g., gains, constants) as added axioms. The cloning of some structural
specification blocks like ‘Require’ is excluded, as the main purpose of these blocks in the translation
is to give structure to the verification goals (e.g., Hoare triple inference form).
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Figure 4: Reduced First-Order System in Simulink.
theory M_firstorder
use import int.Int
use import real.RealInfix
use import bool.Bool
function difference_op1 int: real
function vx_op1 int: real
function vx_old_op1 int: real
function neg_op1 int: real
function x_op1 int: real
function x_old_op1 int: real
function not_zero_x_op int: bool
function desc_grad_op int: bool
clone simulink.Sum_int as Difference with function in1 = vx_op1, function in2 = neg_op1, function out1 = difference_op1
clone simulink.Product_int as Vx with function in1 = x_op1, function in2 = x_op1, function out1 = vx_op1
clone simulink.UnitDelay_int as Vx_old with function in1 = vx_op1, function out1 = vx_old_op1
clone simulink.Gain_int as Neg with function in1 = vx_old_op1, function out1 = neg_op1
axiom neg_gain: Neg.gain = -.1.000000
clone simulink.Gain_int as X with function in1 = x_old_op1, function out1 = x_op1
axiom x_gain: X.gain = 0.900000
clone simulink.UnitDelay_int as X_old with function in1 = x_op1, function out1 = x_old_op1
clone simulink.CompareToZero_neq_int as Not_zero_x with function in1 = x_op1, function out1 = not_zero_x_op
clone simulink.CompareToZero_l_int as Desc_grad with function in1 = difference_op1, function out1 = desc_grad_op
goal G1 : forall k: int. not_zero_x_op k = True -> desc_grad_op k = True
end
Figure 5: Theory for the First Order System in Fig. 4.
5. Finally, the verification goals are added following structures like the Hoare triple form from the ‘Re-
quire’ blocks. The preconditions and postconditions are added as desired Boolean signal outcomes
in the Hoare triple:
goal <Name>: <time>. <precond.> -> <postcond.>
If the Simulink model has nested generic subsystems (i.e., grouping blocks with the purpose of
providing modularity), each subsystem is translated into a theory from the computation of its internal
AST and verification goals, using the previously described procedure. These theories are then cloned
into other theories, following the flow diagrams of upper levels.
Consider the first-order discrete system in Simulink shown in Fig. 4, a simplification of Fig. 1. The
translator produces the theory in Fig. 5 automatically.
The name of the theory, in the first line, corresponds to the name of the model file in Simulink.
Then, the theories of the integer, real and Boolean numbers are imported. Functions corresponding to
the signals that come out of the blocks are added to the theory, specifying if they correspond to real or
Boolean signals, and following the convention for the naming described before.
Subsequently, the theories of the different blocks in the Simulink model are cloned and parametrised
from our library (contained in a file named ‘simulink’) mentioned in Section 3. The order of the blocks
is given by the Simulink automatic identification numbering: the ‘Sum’ block, the ‘Product’ block (the
Lyapunov function), the ‘Unit Delay’ block of the Lyapunov function, the ‘Gain’ block to achieve the
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subtraction of the values of the Lyapunov function combined with the ‘Sum’ block, the ‘Gain’ block
and the ‘Unit Delay’ of the system. When a theory from the library is cloned, its name is changed to
the name of the block. The input and output functions of the new theory are renamed according to
the signals connected to the respective block. Examples of value parametrisation in the cloning are the
axioms corresponding to the gains Neg_gain and x_gain, for the ‘Gain’ blocks in the model.
The theories corresponding to the comparison blocks (the two ‘Compare To Zero’ blocks) are cloned
considering the parameters assigned in the model, i.e., calling the respective theory that corresponds
to a comparison of any of the possible types {==,∼=, >,<,>=, <=}. Finally, the verification goal
is added by connecting the precondition and postcondition following the structure of the Hoare triple,
not_zero_x_op1 k = True -> desc_grad_op1 k = True.
5 Verification of a First-Order System
Consider the same first-order linear discrete system as in Fig. 4, for a single dimension (scalar),
x(k + 1) = ax(k), (3)
and a metric for stability given by a quadratic Lyapunov function, that is always positive regardless of
its input,
V (x) = x2. (4)
A system like the one in our example is considered stable if its trajectory in time converges to a
region or point in the state space, starting from different initial conditions. A way to prove stability
of the system in Fig. 4 is the existence of a Lyapunov function that preserves its expected properties
of positivity, and that will decrease (if the system is stable), stay in the same value (if the system is
marginally stable), or increase (if the system is unstable). Stability is proved in our examples for different
values of the gain a computing the discrete gradient descent of the Lyapunov function (the difference
between the value of the function in the current time interval and in the previous interval).
The conditions to prove stability through the signals has been expressed in two assertions added as
blocks to the Simulink model: when the signal x is not zero (precondition), if the system is stable the
gradient of the Lyapunov function should be negative (postcondition),
x(k) 6= 0→ V (x(k))− V (x(k − 1)) < 0 (5)
as shown in Fig. 4. Thus, a failure of proof is expected for the verification of the goal goal G1 when
the gain is >= 1 or <= −1, as the implication would lead to True → False, which is in turn False. The
validity of the proof is expected when the gain is < 1, > −1 or = 0, as the first two lead to True→ True,
and the later to False → False, all implications resulting in True. These conclusions are derived from
the truth table for the logical implication operation.
5.1 Assertion Checks in Simulation
The stability assertions specified in the Simulink model have been checked in simulation, for different
gain values in the system loop. If the system does not comply with the specified property, the ‘Assert’
block inside the ‘Require’ block will fire up a flag when running the Simulink model. The results for
different gains are shown in Table 1, conforming to our predictions: failure when the gain is >= 1 and
<= −1 (thus the system is unstable), and success in the checks when the gain is < 1, > −1 (thus the
system is stable), highlighted in the table. When the gain is = 0, the ‘Assert’ block inside the ‘Require’
is not active and the check does not take place, due to the disabling action of the precondition in the
‘Enabled Subsystem’, as the value of the signal x(k) is 0 and thus the precondition is false.
5.2 Proofs in Why3
The goal has been verified for different gains using the CVC3 SMT solver, compatible for theories with
real and integer numbers, linear arithmetic, equalities and inequalities. The results of the verification are
shown in Table 2. The highlighted results indicate proved stability (not including marginal), from the
validity of both the precondition and postcondition, and the ‘Unknown’ results show that stability could
not be proved for those gains. These results match the assertion checks presented in Table 1. CVC3
automatically computed the validity of the verification goals in less than 150 seconds, our specified time
limit in Why3.
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Table 1: Checks with Different Gains
GAIN CHECK RESULT
-1.1 Fail
-1.0 Fail
-0.5 Pass
0.0 Not checked
0.8 Pass
0.9 Pass
0.9999 Pass
1.0 Fail
1.1 Fail
2.0 Fail
Table 2: Verification with Different Gains
GAIN G1: stability Prec. Postc.
(X.gain) x(k) 6= 0→
V (x(k))− V (x(k − 1)) < 0
-1.1 Unknown True False
-1.0 Unknown True False
-0.5 Valid True True
0.0 Valid False False
0.8 Valid True True
0.9 Valid True True
0.9999 Valid True True
1.0 Unknown True False
1.1 Unknown True False
2.0 Unknown True False
The case study presented in this paper showcases our approach to formally prove properties of interest,
from the translation of Simulink into Why3. The translation is performed automatically for a subset
of Simulink blocks. This subset is currently in expansion. Different theorem provers can be selected
in Why3 for the proof, according to their capabilities. The main disadvantage of Why3 is the lack
of feedback about the failure in the proof, compared to the production of counterexamples in model
checking tools. Nevertheless, the tool chain can be extended to incorporate equivalent mechanisms for
feedback.
6 Conclusion
This paper presented an approach to formally verify high level properties of interest of control systems
(e.g., stability) as Simulink models in a more automatic manner in Why3 (using theorem proving tools).
The Simulink model is specified or annotated with assertions in blocks from our proposed reference
library. The Simulink models are translated automatically into the Why3 logic syntax, from the signals
in time and the block connections (computing an abstract syntax tree). The translation process is helped
by our library of theories in Why3 that correspond to the functionality of a set of Simulink blocks. The
assertion blocks are translated into verification goals, and then proved by calling different theorem provers
in Why3 according to their capabilities (theories).
An example of the translation and verification was provided in the form of a first-order discrete
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system, coupled with a Lyapunov function as a metric for stability. The verification goals were proved or
otherwise, according to the expected stability results for different parameters (gain and initial values),
using the CVC3 theorem prover (or its embedded SMT solver). Assertion checks were performed over
the Simulink model in simulation, to show the useful duality of our proposed specification approach.
Immediate future work includes extending our approach to multidimensional problems by incorpo-
rating linear algebra theories in Why3. Other future work includes the expansion of our libraries of
assertion blocks and theories for supported Simulink blocks, for other high-level properties of interest
(e.g., robustness) and stability methods. We are intending to apply our methodology and tools to a
diverse range of systems.
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